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Liste di mobilità (LM) is an Italian labour market programme targeted to dismissed workers. 
There is a ‘passive’ component granting monetary benefits to employees dismissed by firms 
larger than 15 employees, and an ‘active’ component providing an employment subsidy to 
any firm hiring workers from the LM. Eligibility duration varies with the worker’s age at 
dismissal. We exploit the variability of these provisions to evaluate the impact of extending 
the duration of eligibility on re-employment probabilities and wages over the 36 months 
subsequent to enrolment in the programme. The average treatment effect is identified via a 
Regression Discontinuity Design. A major negative impact emerges for workers aged 50 or 
more granted the monetary benefit. 
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1.  Introduction 
Liste di mobilità (LM)
1 is an Italian labour market programme introduced in the early 1990s 
to handle redundancies in the labour market. The design of the programme is quite complex because 
of two reasons: first, it includes both a “passive” and an “active” component; second, it 
differentiates eligibility duration and benefits according to the age of the worker at dismissal and 
the size of the dismissing firm. 
The passive component grants monetary benefits with a high replacement rate, but only to 
workers who have been dismissed by firms larger than 15 employees. The active component 
provides any firm hiring dismissed workers from the LM – either on a permanent or on a temporary 
contract – with an employment subsidy, consisting of a substantial reduction in social security 
contributions (SSCs) for that worker, for up to two years. In addition, firms hiring with a permanent 
contract  any worker eligible for monetary benefits receive up to 50% of the residual benefit the 
worker would have received had s/he remained unemployed. The latter feature is close to the 
benefit transfer scheme proposed by Snower (1994). 
The worker stays in the LM programme until s/he is hired on a permanent contract or until 
the end of the eligibility period, whichever comes first. Crucial to our analysis, the length of the 
eligibility period for both the passive and active components depends on the age of the worker at 
the time of dismissal: it is one year for workers younger than 40; it doubles to two years for those 
40 to 49 years old; for workers older than 49 the eligibility status extends to three years, and even 
longer for workers entitled to the monetary benefit when they are getting close to being eligible for 
retirement benefits – the latter is the so-called mobilità lunga (“long mobility”), designed to bridge 
unemployment and early retirement. Besides, during the time they are enrolled in the ML, workers 
are allowed to engage in temporary employment while maintaining their LM status (for details, see 
Section 2.2).  
 The aim of the programme is to bring dismissed workers back to work while providing 
them with an income maintenance. The rationale for extending eligibility from one to two to three 
years as a function of the worker age rests on the claim that ceteris paribus older workers are less 
attractive to employers, and thus face more difficulties in finding a new job once permanently 
separated from their previous one. The empirical basis upon which this claim rests is not clear, 
though. Besides, for workers in their fifties entitled to the monetary benefit the provisions for “long 
mobility” alter substantially the rationale of the programme, with the income maintenance aim 
                                                           
1 Literally “Mobility Lists” where eligible workers are registered. 
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taking a dominant role. Thus a better understanding of the relationship between age and the 
extended eligibility for the LM programme would be useful for a possible redesign of the 
programme itself.  
The identification of the impact of the whole programme is precluded by the lack of a 
sensible comparison group made up of ineligible workers suitably approximating the counterfactual 
for workers eligible to the LM. Only the differential impact of alternative packages of benefits is in 
principle identifiable. The research question we address in this paper regards the effect of extending 
the eligibility period from one to two years (workers aged less than 40 and in their forties, 
respectively) and from two to three years (workers in their forties and aged 50 or more, 
respectively) on the probability of being employed and on wages in each of the 36 months 
subsequent to enrolment in LM. The challenge we face is clear: how to separate the effects of 
extended duration of eligibility from the age effect, given that age is the only variable relevant for 
the duration of eligibility. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 illustrates some additional features of the 
programme useful to clarify the evaluation question we address, and presents a stylized example 
which illustrates how firms gain by hiring from the LM. Section 3 summarises evidence from 
previous studies.  Section 4 briefly discusses the likely effect of the policy mix associated with an 
extended eligibility period. Section 5 expounds the strategy to identify the differential impact of the 
benefits, based on Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD). Section 6 describes our linked 
administrative panel data set – and its potentials – and presents the main results of the analysis. 
Section 7 concludes. 
 
2.  The programme Liste di mobilità 
2.1. The institutional context: a brief outline 
Italy is among the countries where workers are more protected on the job, by employment 
protection regulations and a generous pension system, than in the market, by passive and active 
labour market policies (see Esping-Andersen, 1990, for a broad review, and OECD, 2004, Ch. 2, for 
comparative evidence on the role of employment protection regulation). 
The protection of workers against “unjustified” dismissals − i.e. dismissals due to reasons 
other than “just cause” or “serious economic reasons” − is fairly high (see Ichino, 2004, for an 
insightful scrutiny). For comparative purposes − across countries and/or over time, a convenient 
overall measure of workers’ protection is the OECD’s Employment Protection Legislation (EPL)  
indicator. The summary indicator of EPL strictness by the end of the 1990s is 3.1 for Italy: much   5
higher than USA (0.7), UK (1.0) and Denmark (1.8), but close to − just slightly higher than − Spain, 
France, Germany, Norway and Sweden
2. 
An additional point is worth emphasising for Italy. The firm size threshold of 15 employees 
has broad repercussions on the Italian unemployment insurance and employment protection 
systems. At this threshold there are several discontinuities in labour market regulations (among 
which the one just mentioned for the LM programme), the main being precisely the provisions 
against unjust dismissals of permanent employees, who benefit of much stronger protection if 
employed by larger firms (Schivardi and Torrini, 2004). 
As for welfare measures, the picture is basically opposite. The OECD summary measure of 
net (i.e. after tax) replacement rates − which, in addition to unemployment insurance (UI), includes 
welfare benefits such as social assistance, lone-parent benefits, etc. − is around 45% for Italy, well 
below the 65% OECD average (Martin and Grubb, 2001, Figure 3). Specifically, UI to any worker 
not eligible for the LM is definitely low. Over the period covered by our analyses, recipients of the 
standard UI are unemployed individuals who meet the requirement of having been previously 
employed at least 52 weeks out of the last 104 ones and at least one further week previously, with 
SSCs: the replacement rate of standard  UI is 30%, and lasts a maximum of six months
3. 
Unemployed individuals looking for their first job − or with previous work experience but not 
meeting the eligibility requirement above − draw no unemployment benefits at all. 
More generally, in Italy the share of public spending on active and passive labour market 
measures is comparatively modest (Martin and Grubb, 2001, Table 1, and OECD, 2005, Statistical 
Appendix, Table H). The bulk of Italian active labour market policies is made-up of traditional 
measures, such as training (especially financial support to apprenticeship) and recruitment 
incentives, with almost no room for new programmes such as welfare to work policies and the so-
called “mutual obligations” programmes, which combine activation strategies with increased 
monitoring of job-seekers and enforcement of work tests (OECD, 2005, Ch. 3). 
                                                           
2 OECD (2004), p. 105. Data for 2003, at p. 70, document a neat decline of EPL strictness in Italy, both in absolute and 
comparative terms. Previous estimates of such indicator suffered from an upward bias for Italy: see Del Conte, 
Devillanova and Morelli (2004) and OECD (2004), p. 108. 
3 In addition to the case of workers enrolled in the LM, an exception is offered by the Cassa Integrazione Guadagni 
Straordinaria (CIGS). Workers employed by large firms that experienced plant closures or collective redundancies due 
to structural changes are usually granted access to CIGS: a special fund that pays them substantial benefits while they 
retain a formal link to their employer − in principle they are workers temporarily laid off. Workers might stay in this 
fund for an unlimited number of years, depending on agreements between trade unions and employers’ organizations 
and on a final decision by Government − indeed, the fund is almost entirely supported by the taxpayer.
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2.2. Basic provisions of the LM programme 
2.2.1. Conditions for enrolment and eligibility duration 
The LM programme is mainly regulated by laws No. 233/1991 and 236/1993
4. Firms with 
more than 15 employees
5 (we will refer to them as ‘large’ firms), may collectively
6 dismiss 
redundant workers − because of plant closure or restructuring − and automatically enrol them in a 
special register maintained by a regional authority. Workers dismissed by firms up to 15 employees 
(we will refer to them as ‘small’ firms) may also enrol in the LM on a voluntary basis. Informed 
evidence indicates that most eligible workers dismissed by small firms do register in the Lists. To 
be eligible for the LM the worker must have been at least one year on a permanent contract with the 
dismissing firm. The basic features of the programme are summarised in Table 1.  
---------------------------------- 
Table 1 about here 
---------------------------------- 
Enrolled workers younger than 40 years, aged 40 to 49 and older than 49 are eligible for the 
LM benefits over one, two and three years, respectively. During the eligibility period workers are 
allowed to engage in temporary employment spells maintaining their LM status. The clock 
measuring time since enrolment in the LM stops as they start a temporary employment spell and 
restarts as they complete it re-entering unemployment. The duration of a single temporary 
employment spell cannot be longer than one year, and the total duration of temporary employment 
spells experienced by a LM worker cannot be longer than the eligibility duration s/he is entitled to – 
i.e. s/he may double her/his stay in the programme. Of course, during the temporary employment 
spell workers entitled to monetary benefits do not receive them.  
2.2.2. The passive component (only for workers dismissed by large firms) 
As for the passive component of the programme, workers dismissed by large firms receive 
the so called indennità di mobilità, a monetary benefit to replace their last gross wage at a rate as 
large as 80% during the first year in the LM, dropping to 64% − 80% of the first-year benefit − 
during the second and third year (for workers eligible for more than one year), with a ceiling that 
varies over time.  
                                                           
4 Some provisions vary according to industry, worker’s occupation, geographic area, etc., and underwent frequent 
modifications over time. We just outline the main provisions relevant to our area and period of analysis. For details, see 
Anastasia et al. (2004), pp. 49-64, Caruso and Pisauro (2005) and references therein. 
5 The firm size threshold goes up to 50 employees for firms in some branches of retail and sales and transportation. 
6 Those firms should have “collective redundancies”, that is at least five redundancies within a period of four months.   7
Furthermore, a special provision holds for workers older than 49 dismissed by large firms 
and meeting some additional conditions with respect to retirement rules. They are entitled to remain 
in the LM, drawing the monetary benefit, up to their retirement age – as anticipated, this is the so-
called “long mobility”. The crucial additional eligibility condition is to have 28 years of SSCs, 
including years spent in the LM. Thus, a 50-year old worker with an uninterrupted occupational 
history should have begun working no late than his/her 25.  
By contrast, enrolled workers dismissed by small firms receive just the standard UI (30% of 
their last wage up to six months), provided that they meet the requirements for it (see Section 2.1 
above). As our empirical analyses will focus on workers around the 40- and 50-year thresholds, 
these requirements are generally met. 
Workers in the LM should in principle fulfil some obligations with respect to training and 
job offers. An LM worker who refuses an appropriate job offer by the local public labour exchange 
is dropped from the programme
7. However, enforcement of these rules is largely absent. Thus, in 
practice the worker willingness to accept a job offer is not tested and a worker enrolled in the LM 
can refuse any job offer s/he receives, keeping his/her LM status up to the end of the eligibility 
period.  
2.2.3. The active component (all enrolled  workers) 
As for the active component of the programme, firms hiring workers from the LM with a 
permanent contract enjoy an 18-month long substantial reduction in SSCs, irrespective of the 
amount of time spent by the worker in the LM, of his/her age and of the size of the dismissing firm. 
SSCs paid by the employer drop from the standard rate − in 1998 around 35% − to the fixed amount 
due for apprentices, about 3% of the standard one. Firms can also hire workers from the LM on a 
temporary (up to) one-year basis, this way enjoying an (up to) one-year reduction in SSCs. Lastly, 
firms can largely cumulate these rebates by hiring workers on a temporary one-year contract and 
then switching to a permanent one as the former expires: this way the rebate lasts two years. 
In addition, firms hiring on a permanent contract workers eligible for monetary benefits are 
entitled to receive up to 50% of the residual benefit the hired worker would have received had s/he 
remained in the LM. The benefit transfer has a maximum equal to 50% of total amount of the 
monetary benefit over one (two) years, for workers aged up to (older than) 49, respectively. 
As we will document shortly, incentives to the hiring firm are substantial and may induce 
some firms to fraudulently dismiss workers and enrol them in the LM in order to re-hire them, 
                                                           
7 The appropriateness of a job offer is defined in terms of distance from residence and closeness to previous job/wage.   8
directly or by affiliates or by newly created firms, only to draw benefits. This possibility has been 
drastically restricted by Law No. 451/1994, which was enacted also to prevent these frauds
8. 
Summing up, there are in fact two separate sub-programmes targeted to two non-
overlapping populations. 
(a)  The first sub-programme applies to workers who have been collectively dismissed by large 
firms. (a1) Upon dismissal they enter LM by default and receive a monetary benefit which is 
partly transferred to any firm hiring them. The same firm also benefits from a rebate on SSCs 
for up to two years. (a2) Besides, this sub-programme is fundamentally altered for workers aged 
50 or more meeting the requirements for “long mobility”. For these workers the active 
component of the programme is largely dominated by the passive one. 
(b)  The second sub-programme applies to workers either collectively or even individually 
dismissed by small firms. They enter LM on a voluntary basis and are eligible only for the 
active component of the programme, which they can cumulate with the much less generous 
standard UI  provided they are eligible to it.  
The common feature of the two sub-programmes is the duration of eligibility determined by 
the worker’s age at dismissal, a feature we crucially rely on to design our identification strategy. 
However, the differential effect one should expect from the packages of benefits associated to the 
eligibility duration is very likely to vary across sub-programmes, as well as from the 40- to the 50-
year threshold for workers eligible to monetary benefits.  
2.3. An example to illustrate how firms gain by hiring from LM  
Here we present some computations of the gain a firm can get by hiring workers from the 
LM. To illustrate the point, we build up on the example summarised in Figure 1: the benchmark is 
given by an employee hired on a permanent basis from the market, whose annual gross wage
9 is 
approximately 13,000 Euros. This is the modal gross wage for a blue collar 40 years old in a sector 
such as textile in 1998. 
Adding to the annual gross wage the SSCs paid by the employer, this representative worker 
                                                           
8 Re-hiring was formally prohibited during the first six months of enrolment in LM, and the social security agency has 
been active in order to contrast any practice aimed at evading the law. However, some frauds still appear to occur (see 
Anastasia et al., 2004, for empirical evidence for the Veneto region). Moreover, some rules of the programme are still 
opaque − derogations were occasionally introduced to face occupational crises − and leave room for what might not be 
fraudulent behaviour but simply improper use of the programme: see Caruso and Pisauro (2005), who, for a region of 
Central Italy, provide evidence of some confusion between dismissals and temporary lay-offs. In the latter case workers 
are dismissed and then simply recalled to their old job, a practice that in principle should be at the margin of the scope 
of the programme. 
9 Gross of SSCs paid by workers and personal income taxes. For such a wage the ceiling for the monetary benefit to an 
eligible worker in the Lists is binding.   9
costs approximately 34,250 Euros over two years (Figure 1, first bar on the left). To this 
benchmark, we compare the cost the employer incurs by hiring from the LM workers eligible for 
alternative packages of benefits under alternative hiring strategies.  
---------------------------------- 
Figure 1 about here 
---------------------------------- 
No matter for the worker’s eligibility duration, for his/her eligibility for monetary benefits 
and for the time s/he already spent in the LM, the best strategy for the employer is to hire a worker 
from the LM on a temporary one-year contract and then to switch it to a permanent one. In case the 
worker is not eligible for monetary benefit, this strategy provides a saving over the two years labour 
cost worth approximately 8,000 Euros (23% of the labour cost; Figure 1, third bar from the left). 
In our example, the employer saves 4,350 additional Euros (13% of the labour cost)
10 by 
hiring a worker eligible for monetary benefits on his/her first day in the LM, irrespective of the 
duration of his/her eligibility
11 (Figure 1, fifth bar from the left). Note that if the worker is not 
eligible for monetary benefits, the employer savings on labour cost do not vary with the duration of 
worker’s eligibility nor with the time s/he already spent in the LM. Note, further, that if the worker 
is eligible for monetary benefits, the employer savings on labour cost do not vary with the duration 
of worker’s eligibility only if the hiring takes place the very first day s/he enters the LM. 
As seen from the point of view of an employer who is considering to hire from the LM a 
worker eligible to monetary benefits, the difference between hiring a worker in the two-year regime 
and a comparable worker in the one-year regime becomes relevant as time spent in the LM goes by 
(Figure 2):  
  during the first year it is as large as 3,479·(t/365) Euros, t=1,..., 365, where t is the number of 
days the worker has been enrolled in the LM at the time the hiring takes place. Thus it is zero 
the first day in the LM, then it increases linearly peaking at 3,479 Euros by the end of the 
year
12; 
                                                           
10 Note that the relative weight of the benefit transfer − with respect to total savings from hiring a worker from the LM 
− varies when the ceiling to the monetary benefit is binding, i.e. when it is lower than the 80% replacement rate. 
Clearly, the larger the difference between the 80% replacement rate and the monetary benefit (otherwise stated, the 
higher the worker’s previous gross wage), the lower will be the relative importance of the benefit transfer. In our 
example monthly gross wage was set at 1,000 Euros, slightly higher than the threshold corresponding to the ceiling to 
the monetary benefit, which is therefore effective (though marginally: 725 Euros vs. the hypothetical 800 Euros implied 
by the replacement rate rule).  
11 Here and in the following of the example variation of age is always meant to be around the 40-year threshold.  
12 In relative terms, the fraction of savings is as large as [3,479·(t/365)]/[7,968+3,480·(t/365)], and reaches a peak of 
30% at the end of the first year.   10
  during the second year it is as large as {7,968+3,479·[(1−(t−365)/365]} Euros, t=366, ..., 730, 
as for workers aged 39 the eligibility period expired. 
---------------------------------- 
Figure 2 about here 
---------------------------------- 
From Figures 1 and 2 it is also apparent that the bulk of savings for the hiring firm is 
represented by the massive rebate on SSCs. In the case of the best hiring strategy just considered, it 
goes from 65% to 70% of total savings (when hiring a worker the first day s/he enters the LM or a 
worker aged 40 after one year, respectively). Besides, it coincides with total savings − by the way 
still substantial: 23% of the two years labour cost − in all circumstances when there is no benefit 
transfer, and specifically at the end of eligibility period. 
One implication of these facts is that it might not be all that crucial to a potential employer 
whether the LM worker to be hired is entitled or not to monetary benefits, and whether s/he is above 
or below the 40-year threshold, because in all cases the employer receives the same rebate on SSCs, 
as long as the worker is eligible. The important difference for the employer is that workers below 
the 40-year threshold must be hired during the first year in the LM to carry the SSCs rebate with 
them, while workers in their forties have an additional year to be hired with the rebate. 
2.4. LM in an international perspective  
It is worth briefly gauging the peculiar design of the LM programme within an international 
perspective. The core of LM  programme consists of a combination of two well-established 
measures: an employment subsidy to the hiring firm; a monetary benefit to the worker. Besides, the 
policy mix varies according to workers’ age at dismissal and dismissing firm size. While such 
variation in the policy mix is peculiar to the LM programme, the two basic ingredients – the active 
and the passive component – and their combination are shared by several active labour market 
policies in developed countries.  
The cross-country comparative empirical evidence about employment subsidies suggests 
that they “can yield significant net employment gains and help maintain workers’ attachment to the 
labour force. However, employment subsidies should be of short duration, targeted and closely 
monitored” (Martin and Grubb, 2001, p. 33).  
There is also abundant empirical evidence that UI reduces the hazard to employment up to 
the time close to the expiration of the benefit (see Atkinson and Micklewright, 1991, and Meyer 
1990, among many others). More success stories are found when UI is complemented with 
employment bonuses − i.e. cash payments to UI recipients who find a job quickly and keep it for a   11
specified length of time − or with combinations of services to improve job search and increase 
enforcement of work search rules (Meyer, 1995). 
Looking at the policy mix, a peculiar feature of the LM programme is the lack of any 
“activation” strategy, aimed at accompanying the two components just mentioned. As research 
largely documented by OECD and several other studies suggests, the synergy between the active 
and passive components of a labour market programme is vital if one seeks to enhance its 
effectiveness. From that perspective, despite its benefit transfer component the LM rests essentially 
a traditional programme. It does not reflect the shift in the policy stance towards greater 
“activation” and a tightening of the eligibility rules for benefit receipt noticeable in the last decade 
in many OECD countries (Martin and Grubb, 2001, OECD, 2005, Chapters 3-5, Kluve et al. 2007; 
specifically for the US see Blank, 2002, and Grogger and Karoly, 2005). 
 
3.  Previous research on the LM  
Previous research on the LM has largely focused on programme participants aged less than 
50 years, focusing on the causal effect of being eligible for two years vs. one year on either the 
duration of the unemployment spell or on the probability to be at work at selected post-enrolment 
periods. 
A first group of studies (see Brunello and Miniaci, 1997, and Paggiaro and Trivellato, 2002, 
among others
13) have exploited regional administrative data resulting from the programme 
operations for Lombardy – a large region around Milan – and Veneto – the region around Venice, 
respectively. Because of data constraints, the only outcome variable they consider is the waiting 
time to a permanent job. As for the identification strategy, they rest on (semi-)parametric 
specifications of models for transitions in a two-state space: registered in the LM or permanently 
hired. They use multiplicative hazard models, with a polynomial in age in order to control for age. 
Even in the case of a flexible semi-parametric specification, with unobserved heterogeneity à la 
Heckman and Singer(1984) and a piecewise exponential for the baseline hazard (Paggiaro and 
Trivellato, 2002), eventually one is left wondering how much results depend on the particular 
parametric specification assumptions, and to which particular sub-population they refer to
14. 
                                                           
13 See Anastasia et al (2004) for a detailed recognition of data, methods and main results of this first generation of 
studies. 
14 In the presence of impact heterogeneity, by design only the mean impact of the second year on workers marginally 
eligible for the second year, namely those aged 40, is intrinsically identifiable. The intuition is straightforward: the 
variability in the treatment status – two years vs. one year – the analyst needs in order to identify the impact of the 
treatment, is available only in the sub-sample of workers whose age is in a neighbourhood of 40. If the impact varies 
with age, there is no way to identify the mean impact for individuals away from the threshold, so strictly speaking the 
results they got refer to workers marginally eligible for the second year.   12
A more recent strand of studies uses more informative data sets from administrative archives 
resulting from the operations of public labour exchanges, which provide detailed information on 
work histories and some additional demographics. Caruso and Pisauro (2005) deal with workers 
from the LM of a small region of central Italy. Paggiaro, Rettore and Trivellato (2005), Martini, 
Rettore and Trivellato (2006), and Martini and Mo Costabella (2007) analyse workers in the Lists 
from various small provinces of Northern Italy. Their outcome variable is the monthly re-
employment rate during the three years after enrolment in the LM, which allows to observe what 
happened during enrolment and after leaving the LM for most workers, irrespective of the type 
contract – temporary or permanent – firms use to hire a worker form the Lists. They identify the 
effect of the additional year of eligibility on re-employment probabilities via propensity score 
matching, using both individual characteristics and past work histories. Unfortunately, conditional 
on available information (quite rich indeed), evidence from a test on the ignorability assumption 
implied by matching methods, suggests that these methods are not entirely successful in controlling 
for the age effect
15.  
As for the substantive results from these studies, the prevailing evidence can be summarised 
in two statements: (i) for workers entitled only to the active component of the LM, i.e. dismissed by 
small firms, there is no effect of the additional year of eligibility on re-employment probabilities 
and on the time spent waiting for the first permanent job; (ii) for workers entitled also to monetary 
benefits, i.e. dismissed by large firms, the additional year of eligibility has a negative impact: older 
workers, who draw benefits longer, have significantly lower re-employment probabilities – and a 
significantly lower hazard to the first permanent job – than their younger colleagues. This effect 
tends to be larger for women, but not consistently across all the case-studies. 
 
4.  What are the likely effects of extending the eligibility period? 
We address the question by focusing on the differential effect of being eligible for two years 
in the LM instead of just one. The issue can be formulated as follows: in which direction does 
allowing workers just above the 40-year threshold to stay in the programme for two years affect 
their chance of re-employment relative to what would happen to them with a one year eligibility?  
With the standard job search model as a background (Mortensen and Pissarides, 1999), it is 
apparent that there are two contrasting incentives stemming from the LM programme: (i) the 
incentive to firms, which benefit from the rebate on SSCs (and in some cases from the benefit 
transfer), to provide workers enrolled in the LM with more job offers that they would otherwise 
                                                           
15 The test consists of splitting controls (and treatments) in two age sub-groups and checking whether the mean 
outcomes in the two sub-groups resulting after matching differ (see Paggiaro, Rettore and Trivellato, 2005).    13
receive; (ii) the incentive to workers drawing monetary benefits from the LM programme to 
lengthen their unemployment spell by increasing their reservation wage, then to refuse the job 
offers they receive, at least over a large fraction of their eligibility period.  
In comparative terms, both these incentives tend to be higher under the two-year regime than 
under the one-year one. From a theoretical point of view, the sign of the differential treatment effect 
is a priori uncertain, and depends on which of the two incentives prevails. Furthermore, it will 
inextricably mix with the provisions about engagement in temporary employment. Thus, the 
differential treatment effect can only be sorted out empirically. 
 
5.  The design of the evaluation study 
To begin with, in the following analyses we exclude the possibility of general equilibrium 
and spill-over effects of the programme. The average yearly flow of workers enrolled in the LM − 
less than 8,000 − is still a modest fraction of the average stock of unemployed in the region − 
around 100,000, which suggests that effects of the programme on unemployed workers ineligible to 
the LM as well as on the functioning of the labour market should be negligible.  
By exploiting the institutional rules of the programme we can identify the causal effect of 
extending the duration of eligibility by one year at the 40- and 50-year threshold, respectively
16. 
Here we illustrate our identification strategy with reference to the 40-year threshold. The extension 
to workers at the 50-year threshold is operationally straightforward, though the interpretation of 
results for workers entitled to monetary benefits has to take into account that, actually, the treatment 
includes not only an additional year of eligibility but also the bridge to retirement.  
Since the duration of the eligibility period is deterministically assigned on the basis of 
worker’s age at dismissal, when comparing workers assigned to the two-year regime to those 
receiving the alternative one-year regime the econometric problem we face is how to disentangle 
the causal effect of the second year of eligibility from a pure age affect. Let the treatment I, 











I .     (1) 
                                                           
16 Here we do not address the issue of identifying the causal effect of being eligible to monetary benefits – an 
interesting, and classical, evaluation question – for two reasons. First, there are many studies which have looked on 
effects of the unemployment benefit system, in more detail and with more informative data sets (some references are in 
Section 2.4 above). Second, and more important, in our case the firm size threshold of 15 employees, which 
discriminates about eligibility to monetary benefits, is relevant for several other discontinuities in Italian labour market 
regulations (see Section 2.1 above). This raises a hardly solvable identification issue, because workers hired by small 
firms may be different in many unobservable ways from workers employed by larger firms (see Paggiaro, Rettore and 
Trivellato, 2005: 16-17).   14
The outcomes we look at are the employment state of workers enrolled in the LM in each of 
the 36 months subsequent to their enrolment, as well as their wages at the end of that observation 
window. Let Y
T  and  Y
NT  be the potential outcomes a specific worker would experience being 
exposed to and denied the treatment, respectively. By contrasting the mean outcome experienced by 
the treatment group to the mean outcome experienced by the comparison group, we obtain the 
following identity: 
{ } [ | 1 ] [|0 ] [ | 1 ][| 1 ] [|0 ] ,  
T NT T NT NT NT E Y I E YI E Y YI E YI E YI =− = = − =+ =− =  (2) 
where  [| 1 ]
TN T EY Y I −=  is the average treatment effect on the treatment group (ATT), and the 
difference in brackets is the selection bias induced by the differential composition of the two groups 
with respect to age.  
Since it is known that assignment to the treatment deterministically depends on age, by 
conditioning on age=40 – the only point in the age support around which there are both individuals 
assigned to the two-year regime and individuals assigned to the one-year regime – the selection bias 
becomes: 
[ | 1, age=40] [ | 0, age=40]
NT NT EY I EY I =− =,        (3) 
which we restrict to be zero to identify the ATT at age=40. This is the classic sharp  RDD 
identifying restriction, stating that the conditional mean  [ |age]
NT EY  is a continuous function of 
age in a neighbourhood of age=40 (see Hahn, Todd and Van der Klaauw, 2001). The drawback of 
this design is that if the programme impact is heterogeneous across subjects − as it is likely to be in 
most cases, then it only allows to identify the ATT in a neighbourhood of the threshold. As Imbens 
and Lemieux (2008) put it, “the design has fundamentally only a limited degree of external validity, 
although the specific average effect that is identified may well be of special interest”.  
The internal validity of our identification strategy rests on the assumption that if individuals 
just above and just below the threshold were assigned to the same eligibility regime they would 
experience the same average outcome. Clearly, any evidence providing support to this claim would 
be most welcome, also because, at least in principle, one could imagine reasons why the assumption 
might be violated. For instance, one could argue that workers enrolled in the LM and above the 
threshold are on average worse, from the employer point of view, than those just below the 
threshold. This could happen if firms and unions bargain on the composition of the pool of workers 
to be dismissed, with unions taking into account the income prospects of workers, which include 
both their expected earnings (w) and the benefits (b) they would get from the LM. If the union rule   15
to accept to include a worker in the list is w+b>c, with c a suitable threshold common to all 
workers, then dismissed workers entitled to a more generous monetary benefit will feature on 
average a lower w than dismissed worker entitled to a poorer benefit.  
Some evidence that selection of workers to be put into the LM might have taken place, 
based also on the LM benefits they are entitled to, comes from Figure 3. It shows the distribution of 
enrolled workers by age, entitlement to monetary benefits and gender. The main evidence is a large 
discontinuity at the 50-year threshold for men with monetary benefits. As this is the threshold at 
which most of the workers get the entitlement to “long mobility”, it could be the case that workers 
dismissed by large firms has been chosen considering also the peculiar differential advantages 
brought to workers by the “long mobility” provisions.  
---------------------------------- 
Figure 3 about here 
---------------------------------- 
A further reason for a possible violation of the RDD restriction comes from the differential 
rate of success of the linkage between the two archives we got our data from (see Figure 4 and 
related comments below)
17.  
Following Lee (2008) we carry out a set of overidentification tests to validate our RDD. The 
tests are based on comparing individuals just above the threshold to their younger collegues just 
below it with respect to their pre-programme employment history. Since it is hard to think of a 
causal effect of the LM programme on the employment state and on wages experienced by a worker 
three years, say, before entering the LM, any discontinuity at the cut-off points should be 
interpreted as a sign of a differential composition around the cut-off point with respect to 
characteristics relevant for subsequent employment state and wages. Hence, as an evidence against 
the validity of the RDD restriction. 
As for the estimation of the ATT, it translates into the problem of estimating the conditional 
expectations of the two potential outcomes at the threshold. We use a local linear regression (LLR) 
to estimate these conditional expectations as proposed by Hahn, Todd and Van der Klaauw 
(2001)
18. Weights to estimate local polynomials follow a tricube function (Cleveland, 1979), while 
the bandwidth is chosen by using a version of the AIC criterion as proposed by Hurvich and 
                                                           
17 In this case, however, some hints on the direction of the possible bias come from collateral information we got from 
the labour exchange archive. The linkage process essentially misses workers who are not observed to find a new job 
during enrolment in the Lists. As a consequence, the true employment rate for workers over 50 with monetary benefits 
is lower than the one we observe in the linked sample. Thus, the huge differences we will observe between those 
entitled to retirement and their younger colleagues should be considered as a lower bound of the true effect. 
18 We carried out a sensitivity analysis changing the parameters of the LLR as well as using alternative methods such as 
splines and simple parametric methods. The evidence we got is robust to these alternatives.   16
Simonoff (1998). Confidence intervals are derived following Cleveland and Grosse (1991), who 
show that LLR estimates have a t distribution and derive a method to calculate degrees of freedom. 
Thus, confidence intervals are wider and have a better coverage as compared to the usual normal 
approximation, particularly in the presence of a limited sample size. 
 
6.  The empirical study 
6.1. Data 
We carry out our analyses on the population of workers enrolled in the LM in the Veneto 
region in the years 1995 to 1998
19. Veneto is a well-developed region, with a rather tight labour 
market and a per capita GDP some 15% higher than the national average. In 1998, the employment 
rate was 59.6% compared to 52.9% in Italy, and the unemployment rate was 6.1%  vs. 11.4% in the 
whole country
20. Thus, while our main results would reasonably generalize to most of Northern and 
Central Italy, who feature not so dissimilar rates of employment and unemployment, they by no 
means can be taken as representative of the whole of Italy
21.  
The list of workers we started from comes from an ad hoc file from the public labour 
exchange archive. To this set of records we linked records from the INPS – the Italian social 
security agency – archives. This way we get a rich description of employment histories and wages 
from 1975 to 2001. The file resulting from the linkage covered 93.3% of the original population of 
workers enrolled in the LM (the few missing cases are presumably due to errors in the ID key we 
rely on to link the two archives). Out of this file, after some consistency checks across the two 
archives on the dates of enrolment in the LM we end up with a sample of 23,644 enrolled workers, 
i.e. 80% of the original population.  
Figure 4 presents the rate of inclusion in the final sample by age for the four sub-groups 
defined by entitlement to monetary benefits and gender. The only noticeable evidence is a 
discontinuity at the 50-year threshold for workers drawing monetary benefits, with older workers 
exhibiting a significantly lower rate. In Section 6.2 we provide an assessment of the bias possibly 
                                                           
19 In principle data are available from 1991 – the year when the programme started – to 2001. We restrict our analysis  
to workers enrolled between 1995 and 1998 because (i) the quality of the labour exchange archive for the years 1991-
1994 is poor, and this way (ii) for each worker we have at least three years of post-enrolment labour market history, 
which is crucial for estimating the medium term effect of the programme. 
20 Employment rate is defined with reference to the population aged 15-64. These data, as well as those on 
unemployment, are revised official estimates from the Labour Force Survey. Comparative empirical evidence for 
adjacent years is similar.  
21 The main reason for that is the comparatively poor situation of Southern Italy in terms of both GDP and employment. 
Besides, the LM programme itself it differentiated for workers residing in Southern Italy. As pointed out in Table 1, 
footnote (**), for them, the length of the eligibility period is further extended by one year, for all age groups.    17
resulting from this differential sample selection. 
------------------------- 
Figure 4 about here 
------------------------- 
Our data set improves over those used by previous analysts of the LM in several respects. It 
provides a detailed description of the labour market history of enrolled workers, including 
temporary employment spells, over a wide time window extending from several years before 
enrolment to three years after it. This is important for two reasons: (i) we exploit the pre-
programme history to validate our identification strategy; (ii) we can assess the medium range effect 
of the programme. Finally, we are now in the position to measure the programme impact on wages, 
which was entirely missing in all previous studies. 
The analysis is systematically carried out separately (i) for the two LM sub-programmes, (ii)  
by gender, and (iii) at the 40-year and 50-year threshold. Table 2 shows the breakdown of workers 
by entitlement to monetary benefits, gender and age group: 
  Workers aged less that 40 years are two out of three. The fraction goes up to 81% among 
women without monetary benefits, who represent more than half of the whole age group.  
  59.5% of the workers are not entitled to the LM monetary benefits, i.e.  they have been 
dismissed by small firms. This proportion is particularly large among women.  
  The number of women above the 50-year threshold and entitled to the LM monetary benefits is 
rather small. Results on this group will be quite imprecise. 
---------------------------------- 
Table 2 about here 
---------------------------------- 
As for the outcome variables,  the employment state of the i-th individual in month t is set to 
one if s/he works at least one paid week during that month, and zero otherwise. As for the worker 
wage, we move from each of the spell- and (calendar) year-specific gross payments the worker 
receives and divide them by the number of weeks at work s/he experiences in the corresponding 
periods
22. Then we attach to each month the typical weekly gross wage of that month.  
 
6.2. Specification tests on the RDD identifying restriction 
                                                           
22 Each record in the INPS file represents a yearly social security spell, and contains the number of worked days and 
weeks, a sequence of 12 monthly dummies identifying month(s) in which the spell took place, and total wage. Thus, an 
uninterrupted working spell longer than one year is split up in several yearly spells to which the corresponding yearly 
wage is associated. Moreover, during a specific year more than one record is observed for workers experiencing 
multiple job spells (a rare exception being the case of workers holding simultaneous, mainly part-time, job positions). 
Wages are recorded as gross pay in Euros for the year-spell considered. Preliminary analyses suggested that the best 
way to identify the spell length is the number of worked weeks (number of days is definitely less reliable, as 
documented by many null or inconsistent values).    18
Figure 5 plots the employment rate by age for workers enrolled in the LM three years before 
enrolment
23. No significant discontinuity appears at the cut-off points. Similar evidence comes from 
Figure 6 for the weekly wages of workers enrolled in the LM and at work three years before 
enrolment. As a result, the mean value of wages three years before enrolment – namely, the product 
of mean wages for those working by the probability to be at work – is the same across the cut-off 
points. This confirms that workers aged 39 and 40, as well as workers aged 49 and 50, had the same 
employment history before entering the programme. 
---------------------------------- 
Figures 5 and 6 about here 
---------------------------------- 
Since the unobservables relevant for the labour market outcomes experienced by enrolled workers 
are likely to be stable over time, we take this evidence as a validation of our identifying restriction 
asserting that marginal individuals assigned to alternative eligibility regimes are equivalent in all 
relevant respects. 
 
6.3 The impact on re-employment probabilities 
Figure 7 shows the age profile of the re-employment probability three years after enrolment, 
thus when most workers already dropped out the LM. Compared to Figure 5, the age profile is 
much different, with an essentially decreasing pattern. This happens because we are now 
conditioning on workers who previously held a permanent job they have been dismissed from, 
while before enrolment younger ones might have been searching for their first job. The age profile 
shows no significant discontinuities at the thresholds, except for a major drop at 50 years for 
workers with monetary benefits, exactly those who can use “long mobility” as a bridge to 
retirement: the drop is as large as 32.6% for men, while it is 27.1% for women. 
---------------------------------- 
Figure 7 about here 
---------------------------------- 
Figures 8 and 9 show the re-employment probabilities at the 40- and 50-year thresholds, 
respectively, in each of the months from -36 to 36, estimated using the same LLR algorithm as 
before. Over the three pre-programme years there is no difference between groups assigned to 
alternative eligibility regimes. This is in line with the evidence from Figure 5. 
---------------------------------- 
Figures 8 and 9 about here 
---------------------------------- 
                                                           
23 Similar results hold for employment rates both one and two years  before enrolment. See Figures 8 and 9 below for 
details.   19
As for the post-programme years, Figure 8 shows an increasing pattern of employment rates 
at the 40-year threshold for all workers, with a much steeper growth for workers without monetary 
benefits
24. No evidence of a causal effect of the additional year of eligibility emerges at this age 
threshold uniformly over time, except for women with monetary benefits. For them, during the first 
year after enrolment employment rates are approximately the same in the two treatment arms. 
However, starting from the 12
th month they keep to quite different paths. The employment rate of 
women marginally eligible to one year in the LM steadily grows to reach 65% by the end of the 
second year. On the other hand, the pattern of employment rate for women marginally eligible to 
two years in the LM stays approximately flat during the second year at a 50% level. By the end of 
the second year the difference between the employment rates of the two groups is as large as 15.3%, 
statistically significant. Then, employment rates for women over 40 start growing again during the 
third year, and at the end of it the difference between the two groups becomes statistically not 
significant. Thus, at the 40-year threshold the additional year of eligibility does have a causal effect 
on the way women entitled to monetary benefits re-enter at work: even if there is no significant 
effect on the probability of re-employment three years after enrolment, entitlement to longer 
monetary benefits makes some of them delay their re-entry at work.  
The causal effect at the 50-year threshold, as shown in Figure 9, confirms for the whole 
post-enrolment period the results we already got from Figure 7 at the 36
th month. The causal  effect 
of the additional year of eligibility is uniformly negative over time, but never statistically significant 
for workers without monetary benefits. On the other hand, a dramatic negative impact emerges 
uniformly over time for workers entitled to monetary benefits. The causal effect increases over time 
both for men and women. After one year it is as large as 28% for men and 15% for women, and 
growths to approximately 33% and 27%, respectively, by the end of the third year. 
Summing up, we observe a large medium term negative effect on employment rates at the 
50-year threshold for workers entitled to “long mobility”, that is workers using the LM as a bridge 
to retirement
25. For all the other workers, whether entitled to monetary benefits or not, the 
probability of being re-employed after three years does not depend on the length of the eligibility 
period they are entitled to. Finally, there is a noticeable short term effect for women with monetary 
benefits at the 40-year threshold: the additional year of eligibility makes them re-enter at work quite 
a lot more slowly, so that by the end of the second year their employment rate is some 15% lower 
                                                           
24 We stress again that we cannot give any causal interpretation to the difference emerging from the comparison 
between these workers and workers eligible to monetary benefits. See footnote 16. 
25 Note that, as we pointed out in footnote 17, the sample selection process is likely to bring on an overestimate of 
employment rates for workers older than 50, so that our estimate of the causal effects can be taken as a lower bound for 
the true one.   20
than in the comparison group. In the next section we shall characterize the peculiar sub-group of 
women driving this average effect. 
 
6.4 The impact on wages 
We address now the issue of whether the additional year of eligibility has any effect on 
wages, once a worker enrolled in the LM gets a new job. Still with the standard job search model as 
a background, it might well be the case that entitlement to a longer eligibility period allows the 
worker, particularly if s/he draws monetary benefits, to be more selective during the job search, this 
way ending up with a higher wage. This issue raises an additional econometric problem pointed out 
by Ham and Lalonde (1996). Wages in any post-programme month are observable only for 
individuals at work on that month. If the programme has a causal effect on the composition of the 
pool of individuals at work on that month, then average wage among workers in the treatment group 
might be different from the corresponding average wage in the comparison group only because the 
two groups are not equivalent with respect to characteristics relevant for wages. 
We test for this possible differential composition by comparing the two groups – i.e. 
individuals at work in the t -th post-programme month belonging to the treatment and the 
comparison group, respectively – with respect to some pre-programme features of their labour 
market history. Exactly the same way as for the tests on the validity of the RDD identifying 
restriction we presented above, any evidence of a discontinuity in the average value of such pre-
programme outocomes at the 40-year and 50-year threshold would cast serious doubts on the 
balancing of the two groups with respect to unobservables relevant for the post-programme wage. 
Conditioning on individuals at work 36 months after enrolment, Figures 10 and 11 show no 
evidence of significant discontinuities both for employment rates and for wages three years before 
enrolment
26. There is a weak evidence of discontinuity at the 50-year threshold, albeit not 
significant, among individuals receiving monetary benefits in the employment rate (only women) 
and in wages (both men and women). The overall evidence supports the conclusion that the groups 
we are willing to compare, to identify the causal effect of the additional year of eligibility on wages, 
are indeed comparable.   
---------------------------------- 
Figures 10 and 11 about here 
---------------------------------- 
Figure 12 presents the estimated effect on weekly wages three years after enrolment. It 
shows no significant effects for all groups we consider. The only loose difference one can notice in 
                                                           
26 Similar evidence comes from comparing outcomes at any other pre-programme month conditioning on being at work 
in any other post-programme month.   21
this picture is again at the 50-year threshold both for men and women with monetary benefits. 
However, this difference is hardly significant and of the same size of the one we observed for wages 
three years before enrolment (see Figure 11). Overall, the evidence we get is that the additional year 
of eligibility bears no impact on wages three years after enrolment in the LM. 
---------------------------------- 
Figure 12 about here 
---------------------------------- 
The final evidence we consider is on the impact of the additional year of eligibility on the 
quantiles of the weekly wage distribution. Figure 13 presents the estimates of selected quantiles of 
the wage distribution by age three years after enrolment. No relevant discontinuity appears at the 
40- and 50-year thresholds for any of the quantiles we consider, with the only exception of the 9
th 
decile for workers with monetary benefits at the 50-year threshold. It is clear from this picture that 
the larger average wage we observed in Figure 12 at this threshold for workers eligible for the 
three-year regime is entirely due to a longer right tail of the distribution
27. The men 9
th  deciles are 
as large as 608 Euros (standard error (s.e.) 35) and 784 Euros (s.e. 46) at 49 and 50 years, 
respectively. For women the difference is even larger but not significant.  
Overall, we do not deem this discontinuity at the 9
th decile can be interpreted as a causal 
effect of the eligibility regime on wages. Rather, we propose to interpret it as a causal effect of the 
eligibility regime on the composition of the pool of 50-year old enrolled in the LM at work after 
three years. As we showed (see Figures 7 and 9), most of the persons aged 50 or more enrolled in 
the LM and entitled to monetary benefits are not at work three years after enrolment, as a result of 
the option available to them to use the programme as a bridge to retirement. Those who chose to re-
enter at work – approximately 20% of the pool both for men and women – are from the upper tail of 
the wage distribution, i.e. workers who would have been penalised the most by the rule setting a 
ceiling on the amount of monetary benefit they would have received, had they chosen the “long 
mobility” option. This is consistent with the evidence from Figure 11, which documents that the 
pre-enrolment average wage of persons just 50-year old enrolled in the LM and at work three years 
after enrolment is larger than the corresponding average wage of those just younger than 50
28. 
---------------------------------- 
Figure 13 about here 
---------------------------------- 
                                                           
27 This evidence should be taken with caution due to the small sample sizes of these sub-groups, especially on the right 
tail of the distribution. 
28 This is confirmed by looking at the whole distribution of pre-enrolment wages for those at work three years after 
enrolment, here not reported for sake of brevity. It shows a significant discontinuity only at the 9
th decile, similarly to 
what observed in Figure 13 for wages after enrolment.   22
Finally, women with monetary benefits at the 40-year threshold show a peculiar time pattern 
also for their distribution of wages. As we have seen, women just above the threshold re-enter at 
work more slowly than their younger colleagues as a causal effect of the longer eligibility they are 
entitled to. On the other hand, we didn’t find any causal effect on average wages. Figure 14, bottom 
right panel, confirms the latter evidence with reference to the whole wage distribution: no 
statistically significant difference emerges at the 40-year threshold for the quantiles of the wage 
distribution three years after enrolment. On the other hand, by the end of the second year, that is 
when there is a significant causal effect on the re-employment rate, there is also a statistically 
significant difference at the first decile of the wage distribution: it is 137 Euros (s.e. 11) just below 
40, while it is 218 Euros (s.e. 13) just over 40. The difference declines to 46 Euros, still significant, 
at the first quartile, the estimates being 213 (s.e. 8) and 259 Euros (s.e. 5),  respectively. Our 
conclusion is that women with monetary benefits just over 40 (i.e. holding a two-year eligibility) 
who choose to delay their re-employment are mainly from the left tail of the wage distribution. 
These women make the most of the passive component of the programme, spending all the time 
they are allotted to in the Lists and re-entering at work only when monetary benefits expire. 
However, by the end of the third year both the re-employment rate and the wage distribution are the 
same across the 40-year threshold. 
---------------------------------- 
Figure 14 about here 
---------------------------------- 
7.  Summary and concluding remarks 
In this paper we have estimated the average causal effect of extending by one year the 
eligibility to the provisions of the Liste di mobilità (LM), an Italian labour market programme 
targeted to dismissed employees. The empirical analysis has been carried out on the population of 
workers of the Veneto region – North-East of Italy, who entered the programme in the years 1995-
1998. For such analysis we took advantage of a new linked administrative panel data set. To 
identify the causal effect we exploit the deterministic dependence of the duration of eligibility on 
the worker age at dismissal set by the LM rules. We validate the resulting RDD by a number of 
overidentification tests based on Lee (2008). 
Actually, the LM programme is made up of two separate sub-programmes, addressed to two 
non-overlapping sub-populations of workers, but sharing the rule which assigns the duration of 
eligibility: it is one year for workers up to 39-year old at the time of dismissal, two years in the 40-
49 age group, three years for workers aged 50 or more.    23
A first sub-programme applies to workers collectively or even individually dismissed by 
small firms, with less than 15 employees, and its provision consists of a massive rebate on SSCs to 
any firm recruiting a worker from the LM. The evidence we got is that there is no effect of 
extending by one year the duration of eligibility both on re-employment probability and on wages 
during the 36 months subsequent to enrolment in the LM, both at the 40-year and 50-year 
thresholds.  
The second, more elaborate sub-programme applies to workers collectively dismissed by 
firms with more than 15 employees. It adds to the active component of the previous sub-programme 
a passive one, consisting of a generous monetary benefit to enrolled workers, which declines 
moderately with time spent in the LM.  The amount of monetary benefit not received yet at the time 
a LM worker gets a new permanent job is partly transferred to the firm hiring him/her, this way 
enhancing further his/her probability to receive a job offer. Most importantly, a special provision – 
the so-called “long mobility” – holds for workers aged 50 years or more, who under mild conditions 
may use the LM as a bridge to retirement.   
Results for the second sub-programme are fairly different at the 40- and 50-year threshold, 
respectively. 
At the 40-year threshold there is no significant effect of extending eligibility by one year on 
re-employment probabilities three years after enrolment. Besides, we find no effect of the additional 
year of eligibility on wages. This evidence contrasts with most previous studies on the LM, which 
found a negative effect of the additional year of eligibility on the transition to a new job. 
Presumably, this is due to the fact that the data set we used is much richer on the labour market 
history of LM workers – it registers also spells of temporary work, and to the high internal validity 
of RDD.  
The only significant effect at the 40-year threshold is a lower re-employment rate for women 
aged 40, chiefly those with low wages, by the end of the second year after enrolment. As after three 
years the effect vanishes, this evidence suggests that low wage women are more responsive to 
monetary benefits and use them at their best – women aged 39 for one year and women aged 40 for 
two years, possibly because around their forties they also face family commitments, first of all 
young children care. 
The policy implication we derive from this evidence is that the more generous provision for 
older workers is of no help in getting them back to work. It just makes the programme more 
expensive
29.  
                                                           
29 To quantify the additional costs induced by the more generous provisions for workers aged 40 is problematic, mainly 
because of the role of temporary contracts, which extend the eligibility duration. However, from a careful consideration   24
Moving to the 50-year threshold, there is a definitely strong causal effect. Slightly more than 
20% of workers aged 50 are back to work three years after enrolling in the LM, while for workers in 
enrolled the Lists just below their 50s the corresponding rates are approximately 50% for women 
and 60% for men. Which we interpret as the causal effect of the additional provision allowing 
workers older than 50 to use LM as a bridge to retirement. The provision of the “long mobility” 
does have perverse effects on these workers, as it operates as an incentive to early retirement. This 
is in patent contrast with the concern of the European Union (EU) for increasing the employment 
rate of older workers, a concern particularly relevant for Italy which lags well behind the EU 
average in this respect. 
Finally, it is worth noting that, if order to characterise the LM as a welfare to work 
programme, the implementation of “activation” provisions, monitoring of job-seekers and 
enforcement of work tests comes out crucial. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
of these provisions, and from the illustrative example presented in Section 2.3, it is reasonable to presume that the main 
part of the additional costs consists of the higher benefit transfer for older workers.   25
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Table 1: Basic features of the Liste di Mobilità 
Firm’s size   
Workers collectively dismissed by large 
firms (> 15 employees) 
Workers dismissed by small 
firms (≤ 15 employees) 
Age at dismissal  < 40  40-49  ≥ 50  < 40  40-49  ≥ 50 
Eligibility duration 
(years) (*) (**) 
1  2  3 (+ “long 
mobility”) 















- (***)  - (***)  - (***) 
Rebate on SSCs  18-24 months 
Benefit transfer to 
the hiring firm 
50% of max. 1 year  50% of max. 2 
years 
- - - 
(*)   During the time they are enrolled in the ML, workers are allowed to engage in temporary employment while 
maintaining their LM status. The time spent in temporary employment spells  (each one up to one year and 
overall up to the eligibility duration) does not affect the duration of eligibility in the Lists.  
(**)   In the South of Italy, the eligibility duration is extended by one year for each of the three age groups. (This 
feature is not relevant for subsequent empirical analyses.)  







Table 2: Workers enrolled in LM in Veneto, years 1995 to 1998, by gender, entitlement to 

















Age  N  %N  %N%N%  N  %
<40 2,127 45.2 2,929 60.2 2,808 65.1 7,921 81.1 15,785 66.7
40-49 1,392 29.6 1,185 24.4 1,037 24.1 1,366 14.0 4,980 21.1
>49 1,183 25.2 751 15.4 465 10.8 480 4.9 2,879 12.2
Total  4,702 100.0 4,865 100.0 4,310 100.0 9,767 100.0 23,644 100.0
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Figure 1: Total labour cost and savings over two years for a hiring firm under alternative strategies 















































































a Working assumptions: annual gross wage 13,000 Euros; SSC rates and monetary benefits ceiling effective in 1998. 
b Benefits when hiring (i) a worker without monetary benefits or (ii) a worker aged less then 40 with monetary benefits 
the last day of the first year or (iii) a worker aged 40 to 49 with monetary benefits the last day of the second year. 
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Figure 2: Savings over two years for a hiring firm as a function of the time elapsed since enrolment 
in the ML, under the hiring strategy “first temporary-then permanent contract” of a 
worker entitled to monetary benefits, age 40 vs. 39 
a  
 
2a: Total savings by age group






























































a Working assumptions as in Figure 1.   30
 Figure  3: Age distribution of workers enroled in the LM in Veneto, years 1995 to 1998, by 
entitlement to monetary benefits and by gender 
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Figure 4: Rate of successful linkage between the INPS and the labour exchange archives by age, by 
entitlement to monetary benefits and by gender (LLR estimates and 95% confidence 
intervals) 
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Figure 5: Employment rate three years before enrolment in the LM, by age, by entitlement to 
monetary benefits and by gender (LLR estimates and 95% confidence intervals) 
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Figure 6: Average gross weekly wage (1,000 Euros 2003) three years before enrolment in the LM, 
by age, by entitlement to monetary benefits and by gender (LLR estimates and 95% 
confidence intervals)  
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Figure 7: Employment rate three years after enrolment in the LM, by age, by entitlement to 
monetary benefits and by gender (LLR estimates and 95% confidence intervals) 
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Figure 8: Employment rate at the 40-year threshold 36 months before to 36 months after enrolment 
in the LM, by entitlement to monetary benefits and by gender (LLR estimates and 95% 
confidence intervals) 
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Figure 9: Employment rate at the 50-year threshold 36 months before to 36 months after enrolment 
in the LM, by entitlement to monetary benefits and by gender (LLR estimates and 95% 
confidence intervals) 
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Figure 10: Employment rate three years before enrolment in the LM conditional on being at work  
three years after enrolment, by age, by entitlement to monetary benefits and by gender  
(LLR estimates and 95% confidence intervals) 
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Figure 11: Average gross weakly wage (1,000 Euros 2003) three years before enrolment in the LM 
conditional on being at work three years after, by age, by entitlement to monetary 
benefits and by gender (LLR estimates and 95% confidence intervals) 
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Figure 12: Average gross weekly wage (1,000 Euros 2003) three years after enrolment in the LM, 
by age, by entitlement to monetary benefits and by gender (LLR estimates and 95% 
confidence intervals) 
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 Figure  13: Estimated quantiles of gross weekly wage (1,000 Euros 2003) three years after 
enrolment in the LM by age, by entitlement to monetary benefits and by gender (LLR 
estimates)  
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Figure 14: Estimated quantiles of gross weekly wage (1,000 Euros 2003) for women with monetary 
benefits by age, at various years before and after enrolment in the LM (LLR estimates) 
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